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Abstract - The thrust of this paper was to compose a discussion on the unevenness of the international trade platform from a 
developing country perspective. The working and mechanics of the World Trade Organization‟s framework in relation to the 
agricultural products, trade related aspects in intellectual property rights and the use of environmental resources were also 
discussed in this paper from the context of developing countries. Literature reviewed in this paper showed a lot of discrepancies 
of what is happening in international trade under the tutelage of policies crafted and advanced by the World Trade Organisation. 
The policies by the World Trade Organisation have not been quite beneficial to a lot of developing countries including 
Zimbabwe as issues of market access and subsidies on exports remained unsolved 18 years after the formation of the World 
Trade Organisation.  Despite the progress made in the Uruguay Round however, developing country exporters still remain at a 
disadvantage in accessing foreign markets. The playing field in international trade is more biased towards the advanced market 
economies. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade liberalization is one of the key elements of economic 
structural adjustment packages sold to developing countries 
by the Bretton Woods Institutions, bilateral and multilateral 
donors. The issue of trade liberalization has long been 
championed by World Trade Organisation (WTO) as the 
panacea to slow economic growth experienced in least 
developing and developing countries alike.  Achievements of 
export led growth and economic development has been 
witnessed in South East Asia (World Bank, 1997). In sharp 
contrast, particularly in Africa South of the Sahara, there has 
been no conclusive evidence regarding the role and impact of 
trade liberalization and globalisation on human development, 
livelihoods, social welfare and economic development. The 
World Bank (1995) noted that a few African nations have 
benefited from trade and liberalization and in a number of 
cases, trade liberalization in African states was followed by 
misery, destruction of poor people‟s livelihoods, environment, 
marginalization of poor economies and their communities.  
The thrust of this paper is to compose a critical interjection 
and review on the misgivings of free trade and trade 
liberalization as advanced by WTO to a number of developing 
countries. In this paper, efforts are made to study how WTO 
policies are affecting the economies of developing countries 
and its people‟s livelihoods. This study also seeks to unearth 
the consequences of the misgivings of WTO and its trade 
liberality reforms on the economies of developing countries 
with particular reference to Zimbabwe as a case nation. 
2. Background of Study 
There are no World Trade Organisation (WTO) definitions of 
“developing and developed” countries. Members announce 
for themselves whether they are “developed” or “developing” 
countries. However other member states can challenge the 
decision of a member state to make use of provisions 
available for developing countries. That a WTO member 
announces itself as a developing country does not 
automatically mean that it will benefit from the unilateral 
preference schemes of some of the developed country 
members such as the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP). In practice, it is the preference giving country which 
decides the list of developing countries that will benefit from 
the preferences. 
Trade is the most important issue that defined the start of 
the millennium. Since 1970s the global economy has been 
transformed by advances in Information and communication 
technology, making it possible for companies to shift 
production rapidly around the world in search for lower wages 
and novel markets. Transnational organisations have used 
financial and political muscle to usher in an intense period of 
trade liberalization, in search of the Holy Grail. Beginning 
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with the Uruguay Round of negotiations for the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), one trade 
agreement or treaty after another has come up. From the North 
America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the framework for free trade is being set 
in international law.  
This paper discusses in detail the reasons why developing 
countries like Zimbabwe always complain about “the uneven 
playing field”. The objective of this paper was to provide the 
reasons why such uneven playfield is there despite the fact 
that developing countries alike are members of the WTO. 
3. Agricultural Products 
Completion of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade 
negotiations in 1993 radically changed the global 
environment for agriculture in terms of both the institutional 
setting and the rules that govern broad agricultural production 
policies and agriculture trade relations. Uruguay Round 
culminated in the birth of the WTO, a premier global organ on 
commerce monitoring and supervising the new world trading 
system. However, there are misconceptions that trade 
liberalization is a done deal (Ingco and Nash 2004). In fact, 
we are a long way from free world trade, particularly in areas 
of interest to developing countries. 
The Doha negotiations mark the first time that developing 
countries‟ interests have been placed at the centre of 
multilateral round on trade negotiations and those interests 
included agriculture. Overall, there has been some progress in 
global agriculture and trade policy reform, but this remains 
fragile and fails to provide the liberalization and technical 
support that developing countries had expected from the 
Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture. This generally 
indicates that domestic policy reforms and trade liberalization 
have been difficult to achieve both in the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
developing countries. 
The creation of the WTO comes with the full 
embracement of agriculture as one of its mandate. The 
introduction of agriculture as one of the tenets of WTO 
brought about implications and one of them was the changes 
in market access conditions especially for developing nations 
in the African region (Oyejide and Lyakurwa, 2005). Thus, 
the policy makers in developing countries needs to explore 
how and to define the extent to which WTO frameworks 
constrains the agriculture sector. Reluctance on part of the 
developed countries to increase market access to developing 
countries obviously gives rise to an uneven playing field. 
There are also concerns that developing countries must 
confront and address with regards to the impact of poor 
market access in developed countries on the external policy 
environment.  . 
There are claims that Africa‟s heavy dependence on 
agricultural exports is made more problematic by lack of 
diversification in commodities that constitute the region‟s 
agricultural export basket. Despite the attempt by developed 
countries to reduce their export subsidies over the 
implementation period by 36% for monetary outlays, it has 
not benefited the developing countries (Oyejide and 
Lyakurwa‟ 2005). Under the agreement on agriculture, 
provision was also made for possible technical assistance for 
developing countries but the developed world has not been 
meeting part of their bargain as well, thus giving rise to an 
uneven playing field within agricultural products trade. 
World history has been marked by a global controversy 
over trade agreements and the so called “free trade”. Within 
this larger controversy, issues of agriculture trade and farm 
subsidies have played a central role. Subsidies have given 
high and unfair advantage to the farmers in major developed 
countries (Das 2003:15). Recent estimates have indicated that 
the total domestic support, of which the exempted categories 
constitute a major proportion, comes to nearly US$ 360 
billion per year in the developed countries (Das 2003:15). 
Such high domestic support has the potential of causing major 
damage to the domestic production and  exports prospects of 
developing countries in the area of agriculture (Das 2003:15). 
There is no reason whatsoever why these support measures 
should not be reduced. 
Despite claims of generous concessions, like 60% cuts in 
domestic support, the only sure outcome of the United States 
government‟s WTO proposals is trade rules that continue to 
benefit Transnational Companies grain and livestock 
corporations in cheap commodities (Rosset 2006). The USA 
continually circumvents member country criticisms and 
various WTO rulings to the effect that many USA subsidy 
payments violate WTO limits on domestic support (Rosset 
2006). In the end, the agricultural market becomes extremely 
uneven and trade in this regard follows the same. 
The goal of WTO in liberalizing trade is unworkable and 
threatens livelihoods of farmers, food security of the world‟s 
population, and functioning of natural environments. 
Liberalizing trade in agriculture forces farmers to desperately 
increase production, and it also reduce prices of agricultural 
products downwards. Trade liberalization in agricultural 
products has opened the developing countries‟ market to a 
flood of very cheaply priced food import from the developed 
world. Developing countries have liberalized more that the 
developed countries, hence market access is not well defined 
across the member states of WTO (Rosset 2006:26). 
There is a technical disagreement over what constitutes 
dumping; however in general, it refers to the exports of 
products to third world countries at prices below the cost of 
production (Rosset 2006:29). When products from the 
developed countries enter local markets at prices below cost 
of production, local farmers in developing countries cannot 
compete and are driven off the land and cast into deepening 
poverty (Rosset 2006). The developed world countries 
especially the European Union and USA are more frequent 
victims of dumping, especially on food and agriculture. 
Hence, it goes without saying that the trading field in 
international trade is uneven and has a bias towards the EU 
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and the U.S. than the developing countries.  
4. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) is an international agreement 
administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that 
sets down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual 
property (IP) regulation as applied to nationals of other WTO 
Members. It was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
1994( Das 2003). 
Specifically, TRIPS contains requirements that nations' 
laws must meet for copyright rights, including the rights of 
performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting 
organizations; geographical indications, including 
appellations of origin; industrial designs; integrated circuit 
layout-designs; patents; monopolies for the developers of new 
plant varieties; trademarks; trade dress; and undisclosed or 
confidential information. TRIPS also specify enforcement 
procedures, remedies, and dispute resolution procedures. 
Protection and enforcement of all intellectual property rights 
shall meet the objectives to contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination 
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations (Rosset 2006). 
The TRIPS agreement introduced intellectual property 
law into the international trading system for the first time and 
remains the most comprehensive international agreement on 
intellectual property to date. In 2001, developing countries, 
concerned that developed countries were insisting on an 
overly narrow reading of TRIPS, initiated a round of talks that 
resulted in the Doha Declaration (Watal and Kampf, 2007) 
The Doha declaration is a WTO statement that clarifies the 
scope of TRIPS, stating for example that TRIPS can and 
should be interpreted in light of the goal "to promote access to 
medicines for all (Das, 2003). 
TRIPS was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994. Its 
inclusion was the zenith of a program of intense lobbying by 
the United States, supported by the European Union, Japan 
and other developed nations. Campaigns of unilateral 
economic encouragement under the Generalized System of 
Preferences and bullying under Section 301 of the Trade Act 
played an important role in defeating competing policy 
positions that were favoured by developing countries, most 
notably Korea and Brazil, but also including Thailand, India 
and Caribbean Basin states. In turn, the United States 
stratagem of linking trade policy to intellectual property 
standards can be traced back to the entrepreneurship of senior 
management at Pfizer in the early 1980s, who mobilized 
corporations in the United States and made maximizing 
intellectual property privileges the number one priority of 
trade policy in the United States (Braithwaite and Drahos, 
2000). 
After the Uruguay round, GATT became the basis for the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization. Because 
ratification of TRIPS is a compulsory requirement of World 
Trade Organization membership, any country seeking to 
obtain easy entrée to the numerous international markets 
opened by the World Trade Organization must enact the strict 
intellectual property laws mandated by TRIPS. For this reason, 
TRIPS is the most important multilateral instrument for the 
globalization of intellectual property laws. States like Russia 
and China that were very unlikely to join the Berne 
Convention have found the prospect of WTO membership a 
powerful enticement (Musungu and Cecilia 2005). 
Furthermore, unlike other agreements on intellectual 
property, TRIPS has a powerful enforcement mechanism. 
States can be disciplined through the WTO's dispute 
settlement mechanism.The Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of the 
aspects of the world trading system on which the views of the 
industrialized and developing countries are sharply divided. 
While the industrialized countries celebrate the Agreement as 
a breakthrough in the global protection of intellectual 
property, the developing countries fear that rising prices of 
knowledge-intensive products and impeded access to 
know-how will delay their technological catching-up process 
(Finger and Nogués 2006).Intellectual property rights are an 
important means of promoting technological progress because 
they give inventors monopoly rights in their innovations for a 
limited period. This has the disadvantage of preventing the 
socially desirable earliest possible dissemination of 
knowledge (Musungu and Cecilia 2005). 
The TRIPS Agreement is leading to the international 
approximation of legislation on the protection of intellectual 
property at a relatively high level and to a significant increase 
in protection in most developing countries. The less 
developed countries will suffer welfare losses while more 
advanced developed countries may also benefit from stronger 
intellectual property rights because of increasing technology 
transfer and domestic innovation (Watal 2007). 
Neither the historical experience of today‟s industrialized 
countries nor economic theory endorse every aspect of the 
TRIPS Agreement. In patent law in particular there is room 
for development-friendly reforms. The flexibility allowed by 
the Agreement should be retained and, where appropriate, 
widened. At all events, the industrialized countries must 
refrain from using bilateral pressure to induce developing 
countries to afford even greater protection to intellectual 
property than that required by the TRIPS Agreement (Watal 
2007; Finger 2009). 
The TRIPS Agreement raises major problems in 
developing countries when little or no advantage is taken of 
existing flexibility. Many developing countries need help with 
the incorporation of the requirements of the Agreement into 
national legislation with appropriate account taken of their 
economic and social needs. 
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Apart from participating in the debates in the World Trade 
Organization, industrialized countries should increase their 
efforts to make relevant know-how and technology available 
to developing countries: targeted incentives may promote the 
transfer of technology to developing countries; public 
research in areas of relevance to developing countries should 
again be stepped up; public research institutions should be 
granted special authorization to use patented products and 
processes (Musungu and Cecilia 2005).  
All intellectual property policies must allow governments 
to limit patent protection in order to protect public health and 
safety. This is especially essential in relation to life-saving 
medicines and life forms. The patenting of life-forms and 
their parts, including microorganisms, must be prohibited in 
all national and international regimes. Current intellectual 
property rules in trade pacts, such as the WTO Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, obstruct 
consumer access to essential medicines and other goods 
leading to private appropriation of life forms and traditional 
knowledge. Thus, it therefore undermines biodiversity, and 
keep impoverished countries from increasing their levels of 
social and economic welfare (Musungu and Cecilia 2005). 
There is no basis for inclusion of such intellectual property 
claims in a trade agreement. 
At the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the WTO agreed to 
non-binding language stating that the TRIPS agreement 
should not prevent WTO members from taking measures to 
protect public health. Since the language was non-binding, the 
reality is unfortunately that the TRIPS agreement still makes 
it hard to make affordable medicines available to people. In 
addition, pharmaceutical companies are angling to weaken 
and destroy even this non-binding pro-public health 
interpretation at the Cancun Ministerial (Das 2003). 
4.1. Controversy of TRIPS 
Since TRIPS came into force it has received a budding 
echelon of disparagement from developing countries, 
academics, and Non-governmental organizations. Some of 
this disparagement is against the WTO as a whole, but many 
advocates of trade liberalization also regard TRIPS as an 
awful policy (see, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati'sIn Defense 
of Globalization for a discussion on the detrimental effect of 
TRIPS on access to medicines in developing countries). 
TRIPS' wealth redeployment effects (moving money from 
people in developing countries to copyright and patent owners 
in developed countries) and its imposition of artificial scarcity 
on the citizens of countries that would otherwise have had 
weaker intellectual property laws are a common basis for such 
criticisms (Finger 2009). 
The most visible conflict has been over AIDS drugs in 
Africa. Despite the role that patents have played in 
maintaining higher drug costs for public health programs 
across Africa, this controversy has not led to a revision of 
TRIPs. Instead, an interpretive statement, the Doha 
Declaration, was issued in November 2001, which indicated 
that TRIPs should not prevent states from dealing with public 
health crises. After Doha, the United States and to a lesser 
extent other developed nations began working to minimize 
the effect of the declaration (Musungu and Cecilia 2005). 
A 2003 agreement loosened the domestic market 
requirement, and allows developing countries to export to 
other countries where there is a national health problem as 
long as drugs exported are not part of a commercial or 
industrial policy. Drugs exported under such a regime may be 
packaged or colored differently to prevent them from 
prejudicing markets in the developed world (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000). 
In 2003, the Bush administration also changed its position, 
concluding that generic treatments might in fact be a 
component of an effective strategy to combat HIV. Bush 
created the PEPFAR program, which received $15 billion 
from 2003-2007, and was reauthorized in 2007 for $30 billion 
over the next five years. Despite wavering on the issue of 
compulsory licensing, PEPFAR began to distribute generic 
drugs in 2004-5. 
Another controversy has been over the TRIPS Article 27 
requirements for patentability "in all fields of technology", 
and whether or not this necessitates the granting of software 
and business method patents. In France, the Cour de Cassation 
and an Appeal Court have dismissed an EUR 520 million 
software piracy case, ruling that U.S. Copyright certificates 
were not providing any protection and that software sold by 
its author during a decade in more than 140 countries does not 
deserve the "originality" criteria because it was "banal",and 
prior art in the market segment being already available. Thus, 
it can be deduced from this literature that the playing field in 
world trade of TRIPS has not been evened (Das 2003). 
The obligations under TRIPS apply equally to all member 
states, however developing countries were allowed extra time 
to implement the applicable changes to their national laws, in 
two tiers of transition according to their level of development. 
The transition period for developing countries expired in 2005. 
The transition period for least developed countries was 
extended to 2016, and could be extended beyond that. 
Developed countries are massive net-exporters of 
copyright-, patent- and trademark-related royalties. It has 
therefore been argued that the TRIPS standard of requiring all 
countries to create strict intellectual property systems will be 
detrimental to poorer countries' development. Many argue 
that it is, prima facie, in the strategic interest of most if not all 
underdeveloped nations to use any flexibility available in 
TRIPS to legislate the weakest IP laws possible (Murinde 
2001). 
This has not happened in most cases. A 2005 report by the 
World Health Organisation found that many developing 
countries have not incorporated TRIPS flexibilities 
(compulsory licensing, parallel importation, limits on data 
protection, use of broad research and other exceptions to 
patentability, etc.) into their legislation to the extent 
authorized under the Doha delcaration (Das 2003). 
This must have been caused by the lack of legal and 
technical expertise needed to draft legislation that implements 
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flexibilities, which has often led to developing countries 
directly copying developed country IP legislation, or relying 
on technical assistance from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), which, according to critics such as 
Cory Doctorow, encourages them to implement stronger 
intellectual property monopolies (Murinde 2001). 
5. Exploitation of Flora and Fauna 
Trade liberalization encourages richer countries to consume 
more and poorer countries to export more. The end result is an 
increasingly polluted environment (through spiraling waste 
and transport-related pollution levels, for example) and the 
alarmingly rapid loss of irreplaceable natural resources. 
Furthermore, the WTO and other free trade agreements, 
which drive this destructive process, also include rules that 
undermine hard-won national and international legislation 
designed to protect peoples' environment. The "environment" 
was a key negotiating topic for governments when they met in 
Cancun. It was placed on the agenda by the EU in a very 
limited way, but there is little prospect of any real change, 
since the WTO's raison d'être is to increase the pace of the 
overall liberalization process. 
Transnational Companies (TNCs) from the developed 
world are making gorgeous proceeds out of exploitation of 
environmental resources from the developing countries and 
genetic materials, while local communities receive little or 
nothing to that effect (Madeley 1999:34). RAFI has compiled 
a list of instances where genetic resources and local flora 
resources in the South have made or are making a contribution 
to agriculture, food processing or pharmaceutical 
development in the North (Madeley 1999:35). The TNCs‟ 
activities have been equated with piracy that the developed 
has been so vocal about. Despite how much developing 
countries are contributing to the developed countries through 
the exploitation of their flora and fauna, the respective 
developing countries have not received anything. 
Biopiracy by the developed world has taken form of 
companies sometimes via academic research departments 
whom they sponsor taking plant species from developing 
countries without much permission and without offering 
compensation (Madeley 1999:38). In 1995, RAFI 
documented 55 instances in which the developing countries 
were victims of the mighty developed countries of such 
exploitation. Recent examples from Gabon, Thailand, 
Ecuador, and Peru illustrate bio piracy on a grand scale. In one 
of these cases, the University of Wisconsin USA, has received 
two US patents for a protein derived from the berry of a plant 
that growers in Gabon called pentadiplandrabrazeanna.  The 
berries were collected by the University of Wisconsin 
researcher working in Gabon who found out that a sweet 
protein could be derived from the berries. The university 
called the protein “brazzein” and estimated that it is 2000 
times sweeter than sugar. The university has exclusive rights 
to brazzein, which it intends to license to corporations. The 
Wisconsin University believes it can make inroads into a 
USD$100 billion a year worldwide market for sweeteners. 
However, the Gabonese are not benefitting from the 
exploitation of the flora in their backyard despite their 
contribution to the development of the most powerful 
sweetener the world has ever produced. What is being 
exploited, pirated is not an individual flora resources but the 
collective creativity and inventiness of millions of people 
over a millennia, a creativity that is unnecessary for meeting 
the needs of the poor people of Gabon (Madeley 1999:39).  
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is an international 
agreement among national governments. It aims to ensure that 
the international trade in plants and animals does not threaten 
their survival. The United States, a signatory to CITES, is the 
largest importer and exporter of wildlife products in the 
estimated $5 billion world wildlife trade industry (Akyuz 
2004).The United States‟ share of the world wildlife trade is 
between $1 billion and $2 billion per year. 
The implementation and enforcement of CITES is of 
interest to Congress because of the prominence of the United 
States in the international wildlife trade. Congress provides 
oversight on U.S. activities related to CITES by holding 
hearings on U.S. recommendations for CITES, as well as, 
providing appropriations for conservation programs that aim 
to improve the populations and habitats of some species listed 
on CITES. Several issues were discussed at the Conference of 
Parties in 2004 in Bangok, including sport hunting of rhinos, 
African elephant ivory and trade, and harvesting and trade of 
Indonesian ramin timber species. This report provides 
background information on the structure of CITES, the 
enforcement of CITES in the United States, and implementing 
issues related to CITES (Akyuz 2004). 
Although CITES has recorded some success, several 
problems with implementation remain and mostly the 
developing countries are affected with its implementation. 
Some of these problems include insufficient enforcement in 
foreign countries, complex and controversial species and 
specimens to monitor, low penalties for violations, and the use 
of reservations. Although Parties to the treaty are obligated to 
implement legislation upholding CITES and to establish 
Management and Scientific Authorities, some have failed to 
do so and consequently have not effectively enforced the 
treaty. For example, as of 2002, nearly 50% of the Parties had 
not implemented legislation that would sufficiently cover the 
main responsibilities of CITES, including: 1) establishment of 
Management and Scientific Authorities; 2) prohibition of 
trade in violation of CITES; 3) penalties for violations; and 4) 
protocols for confiscating illegally traded Specimens (Kasere 
2000). 
Some also argue that many countries lack the resources to 
police and monitor international wildlife trade through their 
country and consider violations of wildlife trade a low priority. 
In many countries, specialized wildlife law enforcement 
officials do not exist, and enforcement of wildlife crimes is 
not a high priority. Barriers toward effective enforcement in 
range states include: 1) corruption in government, which 
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contributes to the inability of range states to monitor and 
control wildlife crime; 2) collusion between wildlife poachers 
and law enforcement officials; and 3) a low priority for 
conservation in their federal or national governments. 
Some believe that penalties for CITES violations in Party 
nations are not adequate to prevent illegal wildlife trade. 
CITES does not provide guidance on the level or types of 
penalties to impose, and how the Parties penalize violators 
varies widely. Several countries, for example, do not have 
penalties for illicit wildlife trade. CITES does, however, state 
that violations should at least result in the confiscation of the 
wildlife and products, which itself can be a costly penalty. 
The use of reservations by countries to exempt themselves 
from the regulations associated with species that the Party 
objects to having listed is considered by many to be a 
significant threat to the implementation of CITES. Once a 
reservation is taken, the Party is treated as a non-Party with 
respect to that particular species, and can engage in 
unrestricted trade with other non-Party nations or Party 
nations that have the same reservations. A reservation can 
only be made when a country becomes a Party or when an 
amendment is adopted, yet can be dropped at any time. 
Supporters of reservations argue that it provides a country 
with the opportunity to object to the listing of one species 
without having to withdraw from the entire Convention. 
Critics, however, argue that reservations are a loophole that 
can result in the depletion of endangered species if trade is not 
controlled. Furthermore, some have argued that, reservations 
decrease the ability of CITES to protect endangered species 
from excessive trade. 
Several of these implementation problems are being 
addressed by the Secretariat. For example, in the “Strategic 
Vision of CITES through 2005,” the Secretariat‟s aim was to 
increase the capacity of Party nations to implement domestic 
legislation and policies to support CITES, as well as increase 
the cooperation and communication among other 
international stakeholders regarding CITES enforcement. The 
Secretariat is also striving to increase cooperation with 
organizations of other multilateral conventions such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the World 
Conservation Union. 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is an international 
treaty that is steadily gaining acceptance in the world and 
growing in terms of its application. While most believe that 
the treaty has been effective in curbing the international trade 
of endangered and threatened species, some argue that there 
are still many issues and problems with the implementation of 
the treaty. The biggest problem, according to some, is the lack 
of implementing legislation and partial application when it 
comes to developing countries like Zimbabwe whose elephant 
population is fast going beyond a 100 000 herd which is far 
beyond the carrying capacity, and hence enforcement 
mechanisms, in several Party nations. This compromises the 
effectiveness of the treaty and lowers the value of 
enforcement and monitoring activities in complying Party 
nations. 
 CITES bans trade in ivory of the African elephant on the 
basis that it is an endangered species in wildlife. However, 
there are nations like Zimbabwe who are holding a herd of 
elephants that is thrice bigger the supposed carrying capacity 
of 35 000 countrywide. Whilst CITES which is largely 
American driven suggests that, it is actually making 
livelihoods of Zimbabweans to be at risk because of the 
ballooning number of elephant herds. In addition, it also goes 
without saying that Zimbabwe is losing much revenue in 
terms of its ivory sales solely because the developed nations 
have used up their ecological capital through infrastructure 
development and would want to maintain the divide by 
making sure the developing countries like Zimbabwe are 
denied the chance to trade ivory because it‟s a byproduct of an 
endangered species (Kasere 2000). 
6. Child Labour 
Developing countries as a group have experienced spectacular 
growth performance since the late 1980s which is mainly 
brought about by rapid export expansion. Unfortunately, 
export expansion in developing countries has triggered a 
protectionist response in developed countries (DCs). 
Protectionist groups in DCs argue that due to poor labour 
standards in developing countries (including the use of child 
labour), they are unable to compete with these countries in 
labour-intensive products. The view that countries with poor 
labour standards obtain inherent comparative in international 
trade and investment has been widely propagated in 
international forums. 
While poor labour standards in developing countries are 
well known for decades, in recent years it has brought 
developed countries‟ attention, despite a falling child 
participation rate. According to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), between 1950 to 1995, child participation 
rate aged 10-14 years fell from 27% to 13% and was expected 
to fall to 8% by 2010 (ILO 2000). Although the welfare of 
working children is a real issue in developing countries, 
protectionist groups in developed countries are trying to take 
advantage of this to protect their labour-intensive industries 
by putting pressure for trade sanctions against imports from 
developing countries with poor labour standards.  
As protectionist pressure increases governments are under 
intense pressure to demand for the inclusion of international 
labour standards and a social clause in the WTO Charter. Such 
a clause would require WTO members to enforce certain core 
labour standards, including prevention of child labour. Failure 
to comply with the WTO rules would result in international 
trade sanctions (Wilkinson 2004). The proponents of trade 
sanctions believe that such actions are essential to ensure that 
the playing field is fair and labour standards are improved in 
developing countries. When developing countries are forced 
to improve their labour standards it therefore means that the 
demand for child labour falls which will encourage children to 
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go to schools. However, there are three problems with this 
line of argument. First, the incidence of child labour is severe 
in non-tradeable and household sectors than in tradeable 
sector. Hence, trade sanctions will not address the welfare of 
working children in non-tradeable sector. Second, as the 
income from child workers ease, this puts pressure on their 
families‟ demand for loans. Since perfect credit markets do 
not exist in developing countries the ability to borrow is 
severely limited. Even if credit markets do exist the poor will 
not have collateral security to obtain loans. Third, since the 
access to schools is limited for the poor, trade sanctions will 
not increase school attendance rate for the children from poor 
households. Hence, trade sanctions will fail to achieve the 
purpose for which they are implemented (Drezner 2000). 
In developing countries children are deployed in a wide 
range of economic activities including manufacturing of 
carpets and garment, restaurants, farming and selling goods 
on streets. They are also engaged in household activities 
including looking after small siblings and collecting water 
and fire wood. It is deep poverty that forces parents to employ 
their children in a wide range of activities  rather than to send 
them to school. It is estimated that about one third of 
household incomes in developing countries are derived by the 
working children (Drezner 2000). 
There is growing concern that competition between 
countries with different levels of labour standards might 
trigger 'a race to the bottom', especially in sectors where high 
standards countries compete with low standards countries. 
This gives a special comparative advantage to countries with 
poor labour standards thereby stimulating exports and 
attracting investment including FDI away from developed 
countries (OECD, 1996). While 'race to the bottom' argument 
sounds reasonable there is no evidence to suggest that lower 
standard countries enjoy gains in export market and attract 
FDI (OECD, 1996). In fact contradictory to this belief is the 
fact that, countries with higher rather than lower labour 
standards attract more FDI (Drezner, 2000, Stern, 2008). 
Hence, the use of international sanctions to address the 
problem of child labour is counterproductive because it does 
not address the root cause of the problem. Since the 
prevalence of child labour is the result of underdevelopment 
and poverty it is important to address this rather than to use 
trade restriction which are indirect and blunt (Markus, 2007 
and Srinivasan, 2006).  Compensation programs from wealthy 
countries, focused on poverty reduction and better access to 
education are more effective and less costly than trade 
restrictions. Srinivasan (2006:10) correctly observes: 
'Citizens of developed countries concerned with the 
welfare of working children among the poor in developing 
countries could influence the choices of parents away from 
putting their children to work altogether or at least reduce the 
amount of work done by their children through income 
transfers to parents. Such transfers relax their resource 
constraints.'       
Since only about 5% of child labour is found in tradeable 
sector, trade sanctions will not tackle the exploitation of 
children if it is a major concern. Policies like trade sanctions 
in fact reduce household's income and do not encourage 
schooling unless they are compensated for sending their 
children to school. In this context, development assistance can 
be very useful tool which can be used to compensate 
households for sending their children to schools and 
developing new schools in remote areas. Despite importance 
of development assistance in alleviating poverty and 
eliminating child labour, there has been a sharp decline in 
such assistance. For instance, in real per capita terms, net 
official development assistance to least developed countries 
has dropped by 46% during 1990 to 2000 period (UNCTAD, 
2002:32).  
In fact, use of trade sanctions will aggravate social 
problems (such as, poverty, vandalism and prostitution) and 
result in the lower level of welfare. If people in DCs are 
concerned with the welfare of children in developing 
countries, the best way to address this is through transfer 
payments. In addition to this, opening up developed countries 
markets for labour intensive products and channeling 
development assistance towards schooling and food for 
education type programs will help reduce the incidence of 
child labour in developing economies. Quality and quantity of 
schooling is extremely important to encourage parents to send 
their children to school rather than to work. Development 
assistance can be very useful in achieving these objectives 
(Sharma 2003). 
Development assistance can be useful not only for 
compensating families but also improving the quality and 
quantity of schooling which are crucial for reducing the 
incidence of child labour in developing countries. Improving 
school quality encourages parents to send their children to 
school rather than to send them to work with the hope of 
increasing future income of their children upon completion of 
school. On the other hand poor school quality might 
discourage parent from sending their children to schools if 
they perceive the future income is less than or similar to 
present income even after completing schooling (Krueger, 
2006a). Trade sanctions are restrictions on imports and when 
applied benefits the firms and workers that compete with 
imports. Once labour standards come under the WTO rules no 
matter how much standards are raised it is likely that 
protectionist groups seek to exploit the situation by 
demanding more. When developing countries are forced to 
raise their labour standards they will lose their comparative 
advantage in cheap labour intensive goods. This might force 
firms to cut the employment or use the capital intensive 
technology and both will reduce welfare.   
The evidence that is available seems to suggest that labour 
standards improve as income increases. There is a very strong 
correlation between the involvement of child labour and per 
capita GDP. Krueger (2006b) finds that child labour is not 
completely withdrawn from the labour force until GDP 
reaches $5,000 per capita. As economic growth takes place 
the demand for labour increases which allows labour to move 
between the firms -- from low to high standards firms. This 
Applied Economics and Business Review （2014） 18-30                                                            25 
 
forces the low standards firms to improve their standards in 
order to retain workers. In a study of East Asian economies 
Wilkinson (2004) observed this phenomenon.      
There is no need to harmonize labour standards between 
countries because of the differences in the level of 
development. It should be left to the individual countries for 
several reasons. First, while developed countries are 
concerned with poor labour standards in developing countries, 
developing countries feel it is an intervention on their 
domestic issue. Second, people in developing countries feel 
that linking labour standards with the rules of the WTO is 
motivated by protectionist sentiments by the West. It is being 
increasingly observed that support for labour standards comes 
from labour union and labour ministries in developed 
countries (OECD, 2005). Third, since labour standards vary 
between the sectors, international standards designed with one 
problem in mind may not suit all countries. This is an area 
where one size fits all policy is less relevant.  
International community should make every attempt to 
increase income levels in developing countries if they are 
concerned with the welfare of working children rather than 
focusing too much on labour standards. The removal of 
agriculture subsidies in Developing Countries, and opening 
up of textile and clothing markets in Europe and America are 
crucial for accelerating growth and increasing income in 
developing countries and improving welfare of working 
children.     
There is no doubt that elimination of child labour is in the 
best interest of developing countries as use of child labour 
today means a shortage of skilled labour tomorrow. Also, due 
to growing international pressure for trade sanctions against 
countries with poor labour standards, it is very likely that if 
labour standards are not improved they might be considering 
as dumping under GATT 1994 Article VI or be interpreted as 
a subsidy under GATT 1994 Article XX (Brown et. al, 2001: 
24). Improved labour standards are also crucial to attract more 
foreign investment which is essential to accelerate growth in 
developing countries. The evidence suggests that FDI is 
attracted to countries with higher rather than lower labour 
standards (Stern, 2008:13). Freeman (1994) argues that a 
market-based solution, such as labeling requirements, may be 
an effective way to raise labour standards in developing 
countries. Labeling allows consumers to make their own 
decision as to whether or not they prefer to buy goods 
produced in countries with lower labour standards. Srinivasan 
(2006:10) suggests that: 
„By not buying products of a firm or a country  that does 
not observe what consumers view as acceptable labour 
standards they can send a clear and effective signal to that 
firm or country to face it to choose between observing 
standards and retain the market or lose the market altogether. 
If it choose to retain the market by observing acceptable 
labour standards, to the extent the cost of the import goes up 
because of such observance, both the exporting country and 
the buyers of imports share the cost of improving labour 
standards.   If it chooses to forgo the market, then while 
workers in the exporting industry do not gain welfare through 
higher standards, there is a penalty to the firm in the form of 
lost exports. If citizens of the developed countries are 
interested in maintaining the welfare of the workers and not in 
penalizing the exporting firm, they will have to compensate 
the firm or make income transfer to workers‟ (Stern 2008 :13).      
Global trade liberalisation, together with reforms in 
domestic fronts, has made exports from developing countries 
attractive in the world market than ever before. Unfortunately, 
this has triggered a protectionist response in developed 
countries. Protectionist groups are working hard to impose 
trade sanctions against imports from countries with poor 
labour standards including South Asia.  
The idea of overloading WTO with non-trade issues can 
slow down the pace of multilateral trade liberalisation which 
has lifted millions of people out of poverty and child labour 
(Sharma, 2003). The best way to handle this issue is to make 
ILO more effective in handling labour issues and improve its 
monitoring mechanism (Srinivasan, 2006).  
At country level, it is important that actions against child 
labour must be anchored in the National Plan. Defining and 
implementing such a plan is the primary responsibility of 
government. However, government alone cannot eliminate 
child labour without support from community leaders, 
employers, labour unions and teachers. Since poverty and 
underdevelopment are the root causes for child labour 
practices, any program to eliminate child labour should 
address underdevelopment and poverty. 
7. Zimbabwe as a Case Nation 
The discussion of the unevenness of international trade in this 
paper was done within the context of Zimbabwe as a case 
nation. Notwithstanding the controversy regarding the role of 
WTO and trade liberalization on economic development and 
social welfare, the momentum of trade liberalization 
continues in Zimbabwe. Since 1991 Zimbabwe as a nation 
undertook unilateral measures to liberalise its trade regime 
within the context of Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) with assistance from the Bretton Woods 
institutions which was further followed by a further 
liberalization within the multilateral context (WTO), regional 
framework (SADC, COMESA). Zimbabwe went through its 
second phase of trade liberalization within ZIMPREST under 
the new WTO trade negotiations round, Lome Convention. 
Currently, Zimbabwe is pursuing trade liberalization under 
the National Trade Policy which is being advanced by the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce. 
WTO and other Bretton Woods institutions justifies trade 
liberalization on the resonance that it creates opportunities for 
firms to grow through better access to new production 
technologies, inputs, managerial and administrative skills and 
market information to local producers. Competition from 
imports leads to specialization, efficient allocation of 
resources and cleanse the economy of inefficient producers 
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which removes the burden on the society of sustaining such 
entities. With greater openness, small economies tend to have 
higher shares of trade in their Gross National Product (GNP) 
when compared to larger countries and their gains from trade 
are most likely to be higher than those economies that restrict 
trade.  
8. Trade Liberalisation and 
Performance of the Zimbabwean 
Economy  
Economic performance depends on a number of 
socio-economic, political internal and external variables and 
within these trade policies although not a sufficient condition 
plays a very important role.  In this paper, the researcher 
reviewed the performance of the Zimbabwean economy. 
Export performance is critical to the Zimbabwean economy 
and trade has been a substantial share of the country‟s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) with exports being the main source 
of foreign currency revenue in the economy. In particular, 
agricultural exports, which have declined dramatically since 
the dawn of a new millennia, have traditionally being an 
important driver of growth in the economy of Zimbabwe, as 
suggested by the sector‟s extensive backward and forward 
linkages.  
Figure below shows the trend in total agricultural exports 
since 1985 up to the year 2000. Total agriculture exports grew 
by an average of 6 percent between 1985 and 1988. The 1992 
drought led to a 20 percent fall in exports, but these quickly 
recovered owing to a favourable rainfall pattern and increased 
productivity. From 1996, however, the trend in export growth 
has been declining. 
Hence, the need for fair policies from WTO in an attempt 
to foster competitiveness cannot be overemphasized for 
Zimbabwe‟s long-term growth and external viability. The 
growth rate of Zimbabwe‟s total exports was high in the 
second half of 1990s, but then fell since the early 2000s. The 
export performance of Zimbabwe was above average of most 
African countries in the early 1990s due to its comparative 
advantage in agriculture which was dominated by large 
commercial farms, and manufacturing. However, 
followingcontroversial the land redistribution scheme by 
government which attracted negative perception by countries 
which made up the biggest market for Zimbabwe‟s 
agricultural products and controls the lever of powers for the 
Bretton Woods Institutions.  Table 1 below shows that the 
agriculture export performance dropped off significantly in 
2001 – 2004, including relative to the average developing 
countries and neighbouring countries. 
Table 1.Export Growth, 1991 -2004 (Annual Average Rate in %) 
 1991 -1995 1996 -2000 2001 -2004 1991 -2004 
Zimbabwe 6.9 15.5 - 1.1 7.7 
World 8.7 4.8 9.7 7.6 
Developing countries 12.2 7.8 12.5 10.7 
Africa 2.1 9.2 10.7 7.1 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 
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8.1. Interests and concerns in the current negotiations 
round 
12 years after the implementation of the WTO agreement on 
agriculture, trade barriers in agricultural goods still exist in 
many developed economies. International literature on this 
domain revealed that many developing countries in Asia and 
Africa still face the challenges of market access in advanced 
and developed economies because the increased access to 
developed countries‟ markets has remained unfulfilled 12 
years after signing the agreement on agriculture. There are 
many key issues that Zimbabwe, together with other 
developing countries, considers to be important in negotiating 
for future effective agreement on agriculture in the wake of 
commitments undertaken at the 4th WTO ministerial meeting 
held in Doha in 2001. 
8.2. Market access 
The main expectation of developing countries for the 
Uruguay Round was that developed countries could open 
their markets, at least in agriculture field which has been 
highly protected before. However, it is well documented that 
this expectation was all in vain as it failed to materialize and 
live to its billing. It must be noted that under tariffs 
commitments, WTO members were supposed to convert most 
non tariff barriers to tariff on agricultural imports and declare 
upper bound tariffs. Thus, developed countries took 
advantage of such conversions to collect high tariff, which 
was even higher than non tariff barriers in equivalent 
effectiveness.  
Tariff reduction has not necessarily made developed 
markets accessible as shown in Table 2 below. Average 
agricultural tariffs remain higher than industrial tariffs 
because tariffication resulted in higher tariff protection in 
most developed countries (OECD, 2001). Tariff reductions 
have also led to increased tariff dispersion. The structure of 
agricultural tariffs has become complex with the frequent use 
of specific and other non-ad valorem rates. Tariff structures in 
developed countries should be made more unified, simplified, 
transparent and less complex, and all tariffs should be 
converted to ad valorem tariffs. 
Table 2.Tariff peaks by agricultural product groups facing Zimbabwe‟s exports to the EU 
Product group 
Number of tariff lines within a tariff range Number of 
peaks 
Share in total 
percent Total 20-29 % 30-99 % >100 % 
Meat, live animal (1-2) 351 68 79 14 161 46 
Dairy products (4) 197 21 77 9 107 54 
Fruit and vegetables (7-8) 407 10 5 1 16 4 
Cereals, flours, etc. (10-11) 174 29 75 0 104 60 
Prepared fruit, vegetables (20) 310 70 39 1 110 35 
Other food industry products (19, 21) 90 27 8 0 35 39 
Beverages and tobacco (22, 24) 202 9 15 2 26 13 
Other agricultural products (5-6, 13-14, 23) 231 4 14 4 22 10 
Notes: Tariff peaks are defined as tariff rates that are 20 percent or more. All are MFN tariffs. The numbers in parentheses in 
the product are Standard International Trade Classification numbers. 
Source: UNCTAD, (1997) 
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Until recently, Zimbabwe has been largely self-sufficient 
in the provision of agricultural goods as shown by the Figure 
above. From 1985, imports have been growing because of the 
increased shortages of cereals caused by drought, population 
growth, increased urbanization and the shift of production 
from cereals to cash crops. Before the reform programme, 
emphasis was on food security through self-reliance in cereal 
production rather than through trade. As such, food imports 
were minimal. The implementation of the structural 
adjustment programme in 1990 saw a shift from self-reliance 
towards trade. This caused a steady increase in import value, 
and the peak in terms food imports was in 1992 because of the 
drought. Figure 2 below shows the trends in agricultural 
imports between 1985 and 2000. 
Zimbabwe is classified as a net food-importing 
developing country within the WTO. As a developing country, 
Zimbabwe enjoyed some concessions regarding compliance, 
longer implementation periods, and exemption from some 
commitments, grace periods and technical support towards 
meeting its obligations. 18 years after the WTO came into 
being; however, there is no clear understanding of the 
implications of its disciplines on the Zimbabwean economy. 
What is more disturbing is that, before Zimbabwe has been 
able to come to terms with the commitments undertaken under 
Uruguay Round, it is now faced with the challenges of 
negotiating new commitments in the WTO Doha Round. It 
also goes without saying that Zimbabwe faced a decade of 
negative perception by other members of the WTO and hence, 
it lost some concessions regarding compliance and ultimately 
became a net food- importing country from being the 
breadbasket of Africa before the birth of WTO. This has been 
made worse by the current diplomatic row between Harare 
and the European Union which has culminated in the 
imposition of “smart sanctions” and the smart sanctions have 
failed to translate into preference erosion for the Zimbabwe‟s 
goods in the EU market. Since the EU is Zimbabwe‟s main 
market especially for flora, fauna and agricultural products, 
the sanctions (smart or otherwise) has contributed in a serious 
deterioration in the export market access for the country.  
The level of tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) for some of 
Zimbabwe‟s exports are restrictive (UNCTAD, 1997). It must 
be noted that the TRQ of 12 million kilogrammes of tobacco 
which the USA has granted to Zimbabwe goes against the 
spirit and letter of WTO‟s agreement on agriculture in that it 
over protects the USA tobacco market, hence an uneven 
playing field. To further compound this, the TRQ is 
conditional and non transparent. Thus, there is need for 
concerted efforts on part of developing countries in future 
round of negotiations to phase out issues of conditional TRQs 
and incorporate all market access opportunities on a most 
favoured nation basis. 
High levels of protection in developed countries are 
grossly unfair as they defeat the whole purpose of the 
Uruguay Round and the agreement on agriculture. In the next 
round of negotiations, Zimbabwe should press for a revision 
of tariff reduction targets that have to be met within certain 
periods. The aim should be for tariffs of all developed 
countries initially and developing countries later to converge 
at specific points within a certain period to ensure the 
achievement of a level playing field for all farmers of member 
countries. 
Provision of special safeguards presents a number of 
problems for developing countries. The duration of special 
safeguards, criteria for invocation of the same and trigger 
mechanism are invoked unfairly thus making the trade 
playfield uneven. There is an urgent need to reconfigure and 
modify the special safeguards such that they become more 
responsive to the needs and conditions of the developing 
countries. In view of the need to enable farmers to adjust to 
increased competition and also to diversify their production in 
the face of a surge in imports or a decline in prices, developing 
countries should be allowed to levy special safeguards duties 
for a longer duration. They should also press for a revision of 
the trigger mechanisms that unfairly constrain their exports. 
The right to use the safeguards should be extended to 
developing countries, including Zimbabwe that did not 
“tariffy” or previously reserve the right. 
8.3. Export subsidies 
High subsidies in OECD apart from being trade-distorting 
destroy local producers and destabilize and depress 
agricultural prices. Subsidized EU and US grain has 
undermined food security in developing countries. For 
example, USA sales of wheat to Zimbabwe in 1998 kept local 
wheat prices low and greatly affected the viability of local 
wheat production (UNCTAD, 1999). In addition, the 
importation of cheap EU subsidized grain by grain-deficit 
countries in SADC undermines Zimbabwe‟s competitive 
advantage in maize and wheat production in the region. In 
1997, in the 24 OECD countries, producer support to rice and 
meat was, respectively, 4.11 and 6.18 times the value of world 
exports of these products (UNCTAD, 1999). 
It must be noted that at the end of the year 2000, developed 
countries were supposed to have reduced export subsidies by 
36 percentage points. However, eight years after, the 
European Union, still holds 90% of the export subsidies in the 
world ( Li, 2008). The measures which are being taken by the 
advanced market economies have similar effects as export 
subsidies, such as export credit, export credit guarantee and 
export insurance (Li, 2008). It is well documented that the 
USA offers more support to exports through exports credit 
than any other country in the world (Li, 2008). Thus, the 
incessant use of export subsidies by developed countries is a 
clear violation of WTO regulations that promotes dumping to 
developing nations and this resultantly makes the playing 
field uneven. Dumping disrupts local production and the most 
vulnerable producers in developing countries are small-scale 
farmers. These high subsidies are a major obstacle for 
developing countries in several ways. They result in high 
OECD food surpluses, which are often exported to developing 
countries, hence taking away third country markets from 
exporting developing countries. 
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Zimbabwe‟s attempts to expand its regional and 
international market opportunities have been greatly 
undermined by these export subsidies. Removal of domestic 
support and export subsidies by developed countries will 
benefit Zimbabwe‟s cotton, horticulture, tobacco, sugar, beef 
and maize industries. Prohibitive transportation costs limit 
Zimbabwe‟s ability to enter the world market competitively. 
However, because of her location in the region, she is able to 
exploit regional markets competitively. This is only possible 
when the dumping of food from developed nations is checked 
within the region. Reduction in export subsidies and domestic 
support will help to boost the growth of the horticulture 
industry.Nevertheless, there is a threat from subsidized 
products from overseas finding their way into regional 
markets where Zimbabwe has a competitive advantage. 
8.4. TRIPS 
Under TRIPS, Zimbabwe is concerned with issues related to 
health, particularly access to medicine, food security, 
biodiversity conservation, sustainable use, patenting of life 
forms, market access and rural development. Since 
independence, Zimbabwe has applied international patent and 
trademark conventions. It is a member of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization. Generally, the 
Government of Zimbabwe seeks to honour intellectual 
property ownership and rights, although there are serious 
doubts about its ability to enforce these obligations. New 
legislation on protection of biodiversity, patents, copyrights 
and traditional knowledge is in place. Remittances for 
royalties, technical services and management fees must be 
approved by the Reserve Bank. Such remittances have been 
suspended by many companies with overseas ties, owing to 
the severe hard currency shortage experienced in Zimbabwe 
since 1999. 
To protect traditional knowledge and farmers‟ rights, 
Zimbabwe is pursuing possible sui generis policy options 
under TRIPS. The strict restrictions imposed by 
pharmaceutical companies through the TRIPS agreement on 
the right of countries to provide health care to its people and to 
acquire drugs at affordable prices are of major concern. In this 
regard, Zimbabwe advocates the right of developing countries 
to provide healthcare, develop pharmaceutical industries and 
secure drugs at affordable prices for the majority of people. 
8.5. Implications of this Paper on Trade policy in 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is a member of the WTO and other regional trade 
arrangements (SADC, and COMESA) as well as bilateral 
trade agreements with neighbouring countries, i.e. the Trade 
Agreement Group, which includes Botswana, Namibia, 
Malawi, Zambia and South Africa. All the arrangements 
provide frameworks for further liberalization of trade, and 
Zimbabwe has made commitments within each of these 
arrangements towards that objective. However, prior to the 
1991 reforms, Zimbabwe imposed stringent controls on trade, 
foreign currency flows and the exchange rate. The objective 
behind the economic reforms was the abolition of quantitative 
controls, reduction and harmonization of tariffs and ultimately 
the removal of export incentives.  
The birth of WTO in 1995 coincided with the end of 
Zimbabwe‟s economic reform period which was generally 
known as ESAP, during which the government of Zimbabwe 
carried out autonomous and unilateral trade liberalization 
policies. It must be noted that by the time commitments made 
under WTO came into effect, Zimbabwe already had a much 
more liberal trade policy. Controls on imports and foreign 
exchange had been removed, tariffs reduced, the domestic 
market de-controlled and the environment for foreign direct 
investment improved. Given this background, Zimbabwe 
viewed trade liberalization within WTO as a complementary 
and supportive international instrument to buttress national 
efforts. It was expected that Zimbabwe‟s trade and investment 
liberalization would not only succeed but also, more 
importantly, result in economic growth, employment creation, 
increased exports and integration of the country into the world 
economy. Thus, the approach taken by Zimbabwe in the WTO 
was to “lock in” trade liberalization measures initiated within 
ESAP through the WTO agreements. 
Developing countries were supposed to see a rising share 
of global agricultural exports as a result of market access 
provisions. The global share for Zimbabwe and the rest of 
Africa has remained small and that of the Asia Pacific has also 
remain fairly small at around 36% since the agreement 
(Ataman, 2004: 220). However, it must be noted with deep 
concern that the share of global agricultural trade by 
developing countries did not increase as expected as most 
developing countries witnessed import surges and Zimbabwe 
is currently recognised by WTO as a net food – importing 
nation. This has flooded the domestic markets of many 
developing economies with cheap, subsidized imported 
products from developed economies (FAO, 2006).  
Although the policies by WTO required all members to 
liberalize agricultural trade, many developing countries such 
as Zimbabwe and other poorest ones, had already liberalized 
their various agricultural sectors under structural adjustment 
programmes in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Developing countries made cuts under the agreement on 
agriculture on average greater than the cuts made by advanced 
market economies (Kym and Martin, 2008). This meant that 
even though the rich developed countries were required to 
make steeper tariff cuts than developing countries, they 
started from a much higher level and it was therefore not 
enough in eliminating the inequality that existed before the 
agreement. Instead of leveling the already uneven playing 
field, the WTO through the agreement on agriculture for 
instance, made it more badly and steeply stacked against 
developing countries. The effect of the uneven playing field in 
international trade in developing countries has seriously 
undermined the small peasant farmers whose livelihoods have 
been threatened by competition from cheap and subsidized 
imports. 
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9. Conclusions 
It can be noted from the above explanations that trade 
liberalisation is a deal that is clouded with much 
misconceptions. It seems we are a long way from free trade 
and developing countries have every reason to think that they 
are unfairly treated on the international trade market in terms 
of its agricultural products, exploitation of flora and fauna 
being abused in the name of endangered species and 
environmental protectionism and child labour issues among 
others. The playing field in international commerce is 
characterised with non transparent and undemocratic nature 
of the WTO, the blatant manipulation of the international 
trade organisation by major powers.  
WTO is mandated to create a fair playing field with 
principles like “Trade without discrimination” among others. 
It is the responsibility of WTO to prevent unfair behaviour 
like dumping. If the WTO does explicitly favour any group it 
should only be the poor and developing countries that are 
being assisted. However, there are several examples where the 
WTO ( through design  of policy or implementation both) 
signally fails to even  be “negatively” fair and in fact favours a 
particular group ( often the better of, developed countries). 
For instance agriculture; this is probably the most blatant 
violation of WTO principles. WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
commits governments to “improve market access and reduce 
trade distorting subsidies on agriculture”.   
However, a combination of pressure when the agreement 
was written and manipulation means that the world market in 
agricultural products is not fair at all but is actually heavily 
slanted in favour of the rich northern countries. In particular, 
while many of the poorer countries like Zimbabwe have 
liberalized and removed subsidies the USA and the EU have 
not. Hence, it is in this view that it can be argued that the 
playing field in international commerce is uneven and this 
must be acknowledged by advanced market economies. 
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